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2Abstract
In this paper I build a uniﬁed model of economic growth to account for the time-series
evolution of output, fertility and population in transition through the industrialization of
an economy. Speciﬁcally, I merge the uniﬁed growth models ` a la Galor and Weil (2000)
and Hansen and Prescott (2002) to capture the importance of human capital formation,
fertility decline and the transition from agriculture to industry in transition from
stagnation to growth. Moreover, I also incorporate young adult mortality in the model.
Initially, the aggregate human capital and return to education are low and the mortality
rate is high; therefore parents invest in quantity of children. Once suﬃcient human capital
is accumulated and mortality rates are reduced thanks to increasing life expectancy, with
the activation of the modern human capital intensive sector, parents start to invest in
quality of their children. The simulation of the model economy improves upon the
quantitative performance of the existing literature and successfully captures the evolution
of fertility, population and GDP of the British economy between 1750 and 2000.
Keywords: Industrial Revolution; Malthusian Growth; Economic Development; Demo-
graphic Change.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: J10, O11, O41, N10, N30.
31 Introduction
The process of industrialization or in broader terms economic development can be cat-
egorized in three stages [Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Galor
(2005)]: The ﬁrst stage is called the Malthusian stage, where low (or no) population growth
goes hand in hand with low (if any) growth in output per capita. In the second stage of
development, called the post-Malthusian stage, technological progress rises and both output
per capita and population grow, meaning that the growth rate of output is higher than
the growth rate of population. Finally, there is the modern stage1 where output per capita
continues to grow whereas the population growth is low (if any).
Even though there are no strictly deﬁned time periods for the three stages, the Malthusian
stage accounts for most of history up to the end of 1700’s quite well. Galor and Weil (1999,
2000) and in particular Galor (2005) characterize this stage as one with little education
and human capital, low productivity, and high gross reproduction rate but much lower net
reproduction rate (due to high mortality), in turn leading to low population growth. The
industrial revolution, starting roughly sometime between 1760−1840 [Floud and McCloskey
(1994)], lead to the second stage the characteristics of which lasted up to the 20th century.
The fertility rate did not decrease much in the transition [Galor and Weil (1999, 2000)
and Galor (2005)], but the higher reduction in mortality (or increase in life expectancy)2
lead to an increase in population. However, the growth rate of output was higher than the
growth rate of population, so in this stage output per capita increased and living standards
improved, contrary to the well-known predictions of the Malthusian growth theory. Finally,
the modern stage, in which population growth rates started to decline, began approximately
in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century. The main characteristics of this stage are low fertility
1Galor and Weil (2000) call these stages Malthusian, post-Malthusian and modern growth regimes,
respectively. Hansen and Prescott (2002) talk about stages which are only diﬀerentiated by the Malthus and
Solow production functions.
2This is also documented in Nerlove and Raut (2003) and in Clark (2005).
4and mortality, increased level of education and human capital, and high productivity growth.
The characteristics of this stage, along with the previous ones, is well documented by Galor
and Weil (1999, 2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Doepke (2004), Galor (2005), Bar and
Leukhina (2010), and more recently in Galor (2010).
The main purpose of this paper is to build a uniﬁed model of economic growth and demo-
graphic change which can account for the characteristics of growth in output and population
in transition through the process of economic development in United Kingdom as described
in Lucas (2002). The model constructed in this paper is a combination of the Malthusian
and Solow growth models with an additional human-capital-intensive production function
which allows for spill-over eﬀects. It is a standard general equilibrium growth model with
overlapping generations and endogenous fertility decision. On the production side there are
two diﬀerent technologies which diﬀer in their total factor productivities (TFP) and use of
factors. The ﬁrst one, called the primitive technology is assumed to employ eﬀective labor
(the product of number of workers, the portion of time devoted to work by each worker
and the level of human capital that each worker possesses), reproducible capital and a ﬁxed
amount of land. The second technology, titled the modern production function, does not use
land as an input, but employs eﬀective labor and capital only, and also allows for spill-over
eﬀects. Human capital for each worker depends on the education of the worker, determined
by his parents and the rate of technological change as in Galor and Weil (2000) and Lagerlof
(2006). Moreover, I also introduce mortality into the model by assuming that each genera-
tion of households may live up to 2 periods, however only a fraction of them, depending on
the young-adult mortality rate, survive to the second period. With the help of this speciﬁca-
tion, in equilibrium I am able to obtain a formula for optimal fertility level as a function of
technological improvement, mortality and education. Once the model is simulated, initially,
only the primitive sector is active, the aggregate human capital and return to education
are low and the mortality rate is high; therefore parents have more incentives to invest in
quantity of children. Once suﬃcient human capital is accumulated and mortality rates are
5reduced, with the activation of the modern human capital intensive sector, parents have
more incentives to invest in quality of their children.
The numerical exercise, I present at the end of the paper, reﬂects the characteristics
of the three periods discussed in the beginning. The simulation is done for nine periods
corresponding to 300-350 years.3 Assuming that the model economy starts in the early 18th
century, I track the evolution of the variables of the economy up to the end of the 20th
century. The model generates series for output, output per capita, fertility and diﬀerent
than the fertility level and growth of population which successfully match the data from the
British economy.
This paper is related to various other works in the literature. In accounting for the tran-
sition, the model embodies elements from Tamura (1996), Galor and Weil (2000), Stokey
(2001), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Lagerlof (2006), and Bar and Leukhina (2010). More-
over, the representative agent’s maximization problem with endogenous fertility is similar to
the one used in uniﬁed growth theory by Galor and Weil (2000) and many others.
Among the related literature, Galor and Weil (2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002) deserve
more discussion as they are closely related to the present study.
Galor and Weil (2000) is the main point of departure of the model with respect to in-
dividual decision making and the production of human capital. They present a one-sector
OLG model with endogenous technological progress and fertility to account for the evolution
of output, population and technology. 4 The present study, even though largely consistent
with their results, extends their paper with important modiﬁcations and diﬀerences. Specif-
ically, as Galor (2005) also mentions, the analysis of Galor and Weil (2000) do not explicitly
incorporate the structural transformation from a primitive technology to a modern one. In
3As Hansen and Prescott (2002) also do, I assume that each period in the OLG model economy corre-
sponds approximately to 35-40 years.
4There are also many studies such as Lagerlof (2006), Weisdorf (2006), and Strulik and Weisdorf (2008)
which used the Galor-Weil model as their benchmark.
6my paper however, this transformation explicitly exists and contrary to Hansen and Prescott
(2002), it is related to human capital accumulation. This is one of the key mechanisms gener-
ating the evolution of population in the model. Furthermore, adding young-adult mortality
to the model, helps to account for diﬀerent behavior of fertility and population growth rates
in the data. Finally, the present study also complements Galor and Weil (2000) by quanti-
tatively accounting5 for the evolution of output, population and fertility in UK through and
after the industrial revolution. In summary, the present study nicely ﬁts the ideas proposed
in Galor and Weil (2000) and complements the related literature.
Hansen and Prescott (2002) is the another point of departure of this study, especially for
the production side of the model. Similar to the present study, they develop an OLG model
with two sectors in which the economy shifts from an agricultural sector to an industrial
sector in the course of economic development.6 However, unlike other uniﬁed growth theories
and the model presented in this paper, population growth is simply assumed to be a function
of growth in consumption; thereby lacking micro-foundations for factors behind its transition.
Moreover, human capital formation, that appears to be one of the central forces in the uniﬁed
growth literature, is absent in Hansen and Prescott (2002). As Galor (2005) also argues,
such a reduced form analysis does not identify the economic factors behind the process of
technological change, as well as the forces behind the demographic dynamics. The main value
added of the present study on the other hand is ﬁlling in the gap in Hansen and Prescott
(2002) by incorporating human capital formation with micro-foundations and endogenous
population dynamics in the model. This allows to better identify the economic factors behind
the evolution of output and population, as well the factors behind the process of technology
5Lagerlof (2006) is another example of a quantitative study in this regard.
6Tamura (2002) presents a model where human capital accumulation causes the economy to switch from
agriculture to industry endogenously. Diﬀerent than this paper, I look at a shorter period, therefore my
model performs better in terms of explaining the short-run ﬂuctuations in the data after the industrial
revolution. Moreover, I also incorporate young adult mortality into the analysis.
7change. Speciﬁcally, it shows that human capital plays a central role in sustaining the rate of
technological progress in the industrial sector and in generating the demographic transition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, I discuss some empirical
facts from United Kingdom to motivate our model. In section 3, I present the model economy,
deﬁnes a competitive equilibrium and solves it. Simulation of the model economy in its
transition through the three stages is then presented in Section 4. Finally, I oﬀer concluding
remarks in Section 5. The appendix presents an easy proof of proposition 2 of section 3.
2 Empirical Motivation
The claim that the economic history can be analyzed in three periods can be easily
observed when one looks at historical data. One can see the diﬀerent characteristics of the
three periods by looking at GDP, GDP per capita and population ﬁgures. Figure 1 below7
illustrates the behavior of the population of the United Kingdom after 1700. The increase
in the level of population in the long-run is obvious. But more important is the slope of this
curve, namely, the growth rate of population over time.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 2 shows the population growth rate derived from the data in ﬁgure 1. Even though
there are some ﬂuctuations, the trend is that the growth rate jumps from a very low level
to a higher level after the start of industrial revolution and then decreases over the long-run
7The data for population are obtained from Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1989) and Wrigley et.al.(1997). In an
earlier draft of the paper I also used data presented in Floud and McCloskey (1994) and Maddison (2007).
One important notice should be made at this moment for all data used throughout the paper. To be able
to make better comparison with the simulation, all empirical data presented here averaged out for 35 year
periods from 1716 to 1996, e.g. in the following ﬁgure the population level in for 1951 is not the actual
population in that year, but is the average of population between 1916 and 1951. One exception is for
1716 where the average is taken from 1701 to 1716. Data from diﬀerent sources listed above do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly, especially once this averaging is applied.
8almost to its original level. Excluding the ﬂuctuations, and looking at the trend, this picture
conﬁrms the demographic transition in the three diﬀerent stages which we hypothesized in
the previous section.
Figure 2 about here
There are various reasons why population statistics follow such patterns. Decomposing
the growth rate of population to observe the fertility and mortality rates can be a step
towards that purpose. For that purpose, ﬁgure 3 below documents the evolution of the gross
reproduction rate (GRR) and the average life expectancy in England.8 Gross reproduction
rate, which was slightly above 2 before the industrial revolution, jumps to almost 3 in the
1820’s but decreases thereafter up to almost 1 at the end of the 20th century. In the OLG-
model economy which we will discuss in the next section, the mortality rate will be the
probability that the representative agent born at period t will die before t + 1, which has
no counterpart in the data. Therefore, throughout the simulation, we will assume that
the average life expectancy documented in ﬁgure 3.2 has a negative relationship with the
mortality rate in our model, even though the form of this relationship is unknown. (A
speciﬁc functional form will be assumed to capture this relation later in the paper.) For
now, the data shows that the average life expectancy increases uninterruptedly after the
industrial revolution. Notice that the increase in GRR and life expectancy positively aﬀects
population growth. But when the GRR starts to decrease in time, the population continues
to grow as the life expectancy becomes higher. Towards the end of the 20th century, the
growth in the life expectancy ceases and GRR decreases (almost to 1) which accounts for
the slowdown in the population growth rate.
Figure 3 about here
8GRR data is taken from Clark (2005) and from Oﬃce of National Statistics, and life expectancy data
from Arora (2001) and the Human Mortality Website: www.humanmortality.org
9Figure 4 looks9 at GDP and GDP per capita in the United Kingdom. The increasing trend
of both variables after the industrial revolution is obvious. As discussed in the introduction,
prior to the industrial revolution, the growth in GDP is balanced by the growth in population,
so that the growth in GDP per capita is low (if any). But in the second stage both variables
start to grow uninterruptedly.
Figure 4 about here
As a summary of these ﬁgures, we can conclude that the three stages which are discussed
in detail in the previous section are observable from the documented data above. Now I can
build a model to explain these observations.
3 The Model
3.1 Households’ Problem










t is consumption of the young household in period t, whereas ct
t+1 is its consumption
when old. ξt is the probability that the young household does not survive period t. Besides
its own consumption, the representative household can choose the number of children it is
going to have, nt, and the amount of education it should invest for its children, et+1. γ
and  are simply parameters which show the level of altruism the household has towards its
children.
9Data after 1870 is taken from the Oﬃce of National Statistics. Data before that is generated from the
data presented in Broadberry et.al. (2010).
10Human capital evolves according to the following equation:
ht+1(et+1,gt) = ψ(et+1,gt+1) (2)
where gt+1 is the rate of average technological progress which will be deﬁned more in
detail with technology. I further assume that ψ satisﬁes ψe > 0, ψee < 0, ψg < 0, and
ψgg > 0. The ﬁrst two conditions indicate that education increases the level of human
capital but at a decreasing rate. For the other two conditions, the assumption is that faster
technological progress erodes human capital by making knowledge obsolete, however at a
decreasing rate.10
Throughout the simulation, I will assume the following functional form for the human
capital accumulation function.
ht+1(et+1,gt+1) = ψ(et+1,gt+1) =
a + bet+1 − gt+1
a + bet+1 + gt+1
. (3)
This form obviously satisﬁes the four properties listed above.11
At any period t, the young agent born at t can spend his income for consumption, ct
buying capital, kt+1 or land lt+1. He earns rent from his capital and land next period. Notice
that the depreciation rate is assumed to be equal to 1. The agent’s labor income at period
t depends on the wage rate wt, the level of human capital that the agent possesses ht(et),
and the amount of time that he spends working, zt. The more he spends his time for work,
the less is the amount of education he can provide for his nt children. Parameters a and b
10Galor and Weil (2000) make a further assumption, namely ψeg > 0. The intuition is that technological
progress increases the return to education or that the erosion of human capital due to technological change
decreases with education. As Lagerlof (2006) also emphasizes, this assumption is suﬃcient but not necessary
to generate the result that et+1 is increasing in gt+1.
11Notice that a similar function is also used by Lagerlof (2006). Moreover, this function also satisﬁes the
ﬁfth property that, ψeg > 0, if I restrict  to be above some threshold level. In the simulation exercise below
this assumption will hold anyhow.
11represent the time cost of raising children.12 (In the simulation, they will be assumed to be
ﬁxed numbers.) The agent does not work at t + 1.
Accordingly, the households’ budget and time constraints are given by
c
t
t + kt+1 + ptlt+1 = wtht(et)zt (4)
c
t
t+1 = rK,t+1kt+1 + (pt+1 + rL,t+1)lt+1 (5)
zt + nt(a + bet+1) = ¯ z, (6)
where pt stands for the relative price of land.
3.2 Technology
The model I present in this paper is an OLG model with 2 diﬀerent technologies. The
primitive sector employs land, eﬀective labor and physical capital to produce output. The














The variables Ai, Yi, Ki, Hi and Li refer to TFP, output, physical capital, eﬀective labor,
and land in sector i∈ {P,M}. I also assume that APt = At
P and AMt = At
M. This means
that TFP in both sectors grow at an exogenous rate.
Remember that gt is deﬁned to be the rate of technological progress of the economy.





where At+1 is simply be a weighted average of APt+1 and AMt+1, i.e.





where Yt = YPt + YMt. So even though, TFP in the two sectors grow at exogenous rates AP
and AM, the aggregate TFP At is a function of various endogenous variables of the model.
Throughout the model, land does not depreciate and is ﬁxed at 1. Since only the primitive
sector employs land, this will imply that LPt = 1 for any period t.
Consistent with the names of the production function, the modern sector will be capital
intensive and eﬀective-labor intensive compared to the primitive sector. Therefore, through-
out the paper it will be the case that αP < αM and θP < 1 − αM.
The modern sector exhibits spill-over eﬀects which are represented by the function η(St),
where η0(St) > 0, η00(St) < 0, and St = Ntht is the total level of human capital in the
economy. Notice that this speciﬁcation is not new in the literature.13
Since the depreciation rate for physical capital is assumed to be 1, the feasibility con-





t + Kt+1 = YPt + YMt. (11)
For simplicity it will be convenient to assume that the same ﬁrm operates in each sector
alone. Given values for Ai, w, rK, rL, and St, this ﬁrm solves the following maximization
problem subject to the production functions
max Yi − wHi − rKKi − rLLi i ∈ {P,M} (12)
13See Romer (1986) or Wang and Xie (2004)
14The implicit simplifying assumption made here is that capital in possession of the young who do not
survive to the next period is automatically transferred to those who survive.
133.3 Equilibrium and Characterization
Given N0, k0,and ξt (and assuming that Lt = 1 for all t), a competitive equilibrium in this




ﬁrm allocations {KMt,KPt,HMt,HPt,YMt,YPt} and prices {pt,wt,rK,t,rL,t} such that given
prices:
1. Households maximize their utility subject to the budget constraints speciﬁed above.
2. The representative ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts subject to the production functions.
3. Market clearing conditions hold. Speciﬁcally:
HMt + HPt = Ht = zthtNt (13)
St = htNt (14)
LPt+1 = Lt+1 = lt+1Nt = 1 (15)





t + Kt+1 = YMt + YPt (17)
Nt+1 = ntNt. (18)
Here are some theorems that are worth to state before solving for the competitive equi-
librium:
Proposition 1: For any wage rate w and capital rental rate rK, the ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to operate in the primitive sector. This implies that YPt > 0 for all t. Proof. The proof of
this proposition is in Hansen and Prescott (2002).
Proposition 2: Given a wage rate w and capital rental rate rK, maximized proﬁt per













14Proof. The proof of proposition 2 is presented in the appendix.












If the condition of proposition 2 does not hold under these prices, then these are the equi-
librium wage and capital rental rate. If proposition 2 holds, then these are not equilibrium




















In each period t, using these equalities and the market clearing conditions, it is straight-
forward to calculate KPt, HPt KMt and HMt.
Now consider the households’ maximization problem: First notice that from the ﬁrst-
order conditions one directly obtains an expression for et+1 which directly determines ht+1




where λ > 0 is a constant, namely a function of some parameters of the model. 15
First-order conditions also yield:
pt+1 = ptrK,t+1 − rL,t+1. (25)










t) − pt = Kt+1, (26)





1 + β(1 − ξt)
. (27)





(1 + β(1 − ξt))(a + bet+1)
. (28)
Equations (28) and (6) yield a system of 2 equations and and 2 unknowns: nt and zt.
Given values of the parameters and ξt, it is straightforward to solve for both of them. Careful
examination of equation (28) reveals that nt also depends on the rate of technological progress
through et+1. Everything being equal, this captures the Malthusian idea that technology may
limit population growth as in Kremer (1993).
Notice that Nt is the number of young agents(or workers) at any time t, whereas popu-
lation at t is given by this number plus the number of old agents at time t, i.e.
πt = Nt + (1 − ξt−1)Nt−1. (29)




Nt+1 + (1 − ξt)Nt − (Nt + (1 − ξt−1)Nt−1)
Nt + (1 − ξt−1)Nt−1
. (30)
4 Simulation
Notice that, given the parameters and the sequences of {AMt,APt}
tn
t=0, initial capital
stock, and initial number of young agents, (K0,N0 respectively), the initial price of land p0
and the mortality ξt, all equilibrium allocations can easily be calculated. One complication
is that, to compute p0, I use a numerical (recursive) shooting algorithm similar to one used
16in Hansen and Prescott (2002). Moreover, notice that gt+1 (which is one of the determinants
of et+1 and hence of zt) depends on At+1 the value of which is unknown in period t because
it depends on shares of the two sectors in period t + 1. This requires using the numerical
shooting algorithm to accurately obtain gt+1 in period t. I will describe the process in more
detail below.
Before starting the discussion of the simulation exercise there is one more task: Choosing
values for various parameters of the model. Most of the chosen parameters are consistent with
the existing literature. Table 1 below documents the values chosen for the key parameters
of the benchmark model with mortality.
Table 1: Values for Basic Parameters in the Benchmark Model
Parameter Description Value
AP TFP in the primitive sector 1.032
AM TFP in the modern sector 1.518
αP Capital share in the primitive sector 0.1
θP Eﬀective Labor share in primitive sector 0.6
αM Capital share in modern sector 0.4
β discount rate 1
γ altruism 0.675
 altruism 0.49
a ﬁxed cost of each child 0.15
b educational cost of each child 1
¯ z total amount of time 20
My choice of AP, AM, αP, θP, and αM is from Hansen and Prescott (2002). Moreover,
the values of a and b are from Lagerlof (2006). I calibrated  and γ to match the GRR’s and
population growth rates in 1716 and 1751. Finally, I normalized ¯ z to a value of 20.





where ν is less than 1. First, notice that this speciﬁcation of the function satisﬁes the desired
properties stated above. Furthermore, since the initial conditions are chosen such that the
modern sector is idle at t = 0, this requires that ν < 0.4116. Various values are experimented
for its value, and the reported simulation of the benchmark model takes it to be equal to
0.2.
Moreover, I need values for ξt, which is the probability that the household does not
survive to the second period. The evolution of the average life expectancy in UK is plotted
in ﬁgure 3.2. Assuming that each period in the model corresponds to a period of 35 years
and the life expectancy in UK is normally distributed with the mean values plotted in ﬁgure
3.2 and a standard deviation of 25 years17, I can calculate ξt. With this I now have all
information to do the simulation. To clearly understand the eﬀect of ξt on the model, I run
two simulations. In one of them I feed in ξt’s I calculate from the data into the model in
the way I describe above. In the second simulation, denoted by ”model without mortality”,
I assume that there is no mortality whatsoever, i.e. ξt = 0.
The simulation basically works as follows:
Since I assume that the economy initially is in the steady state with the primitive pro-
duction function, g0=g−1=AP − 1.18 Therefore, I also have e0 and h0. Given ξ0, AP, AM,
K0, N0, and p0, I can then calculate e1, h1, n0 and z0 provided that I know g1. However, g1
depends on whether proposition 2 holds in period 1 or not. Now, if proposition 2 does not
hold in period 1, then g1 is simply equal to AP −1. In this case I can calculate e1, h1, n0 and
16For all other value of ν the modern sector is active at t = 0
17I should notice that the choice of the variance is somewhat arbitrary here; however since I assume a
constant variance, it only aﬀects the level of ξt, not it’s trend, whereas the mean (average life expectancy)
is time variant and also aﬀects the evolution of ξt.







P = AP − 1
18z0. However, if proposition 2 holds in period 1. Then, I cannot assume that g1 = AP − 1,
because since this means that the modern sector is activated A1 will not equal AP1. Instead,
it will equal a weighted average of AP1 and AM1. To calculate the weights of this average,
I use a shooting algorithm and guess the weights of the primitive and modern sectors in
total production in period 1 and calculate all the above mentioned variables accordingly,
including the output weights in period 119. If my guess of the weights is above or below the
calculated weights, I update my guess and recalculate. Using this algorithm, I simulate the
model economy for 9 periods from t = 0. Each period represents 35 years, as the idea is to
simulate the transition of population and output from the beginning of the 18th century up
to the third millennium.
Below I present the results of the simulation:
Figure 5 presents the evolution of the population in the model simulations together with
the data. As evident from the ﬁgure, the model with variable ξt closely follows the evolution
of the population in the data, whereas the model without mortality is underestimates the
level of population . Moreover, one can further evaluate the model’s performance to account
for the population by looking at ﬁgure 6.
Figure 5 about here
In the benchmark model with mortality, the population starts to grow at an increasing
rate after the industrial revolution but then its growth rate declines, as it is the case in the
data. One reason why the population increases at an increasing rate is that the mortality
rate ξt decreases, as the life expectancy goes up. Increasing life expectancy is also the
crucial factor behind the gradual reduction in the population growth. That is also why the
population growth declines steadily in the model without mortality.
Figure 6 about here
19Notice that, calculating output weights in period 1 requires knowledge of z1 and e2 which in turn
requires knowledge of g2 etc. Therefore, what I actually guess is a output-weight vector from periods 0 to t.
19Next, I plot the fertility rates nt in ﬁgure 7. Notice that in the benchmark model the
fertility increases ﬁrst (which is the other reason why the population increases at an increasing
rate) but then sharply decreases in the following periods almost to 1. On the other hand,
in the model without mortality, the fertility rate steadily declines and underpredicts it’s
counterpart in the data.
Figure 7 about here
In ﬁgure 8, I observe what happens to output and output per capita, respectively. Here,
I didn’t draw the output simulation without the mortality per se since there isn’t any signif-
icant diﬀerence between both model simulations. Notice that output slowly increases from
period 0 but with a parallel increase in the population, output per capita remains stagnant.
With the industrial revolution this situation changes and both variables increase together.
Figure 8 about here
Figure 9 shows the average rate of technological progress (gt) and the fraction of time
spent for each child again in the benchmark model. They follow the same pattern as the
latter is an increasing function of the former. Time spent for each child goes from a level of
2% up to almost 21% of total available time of the parent. This is to explain the increase in
the education and human capital of children.
Figure 9 about here
Lastly, ﬁgure 10 illustrates the evolution of the shares of the primitive and the modern
sectors. The primitive sector never shuts down but becomes very insigniﬁcant after the ﬁfth
period of the model, whereas the modern sector slowly becomes the dominant sector of the
economy.
Figure 10 about here
205 Concluding remarks
In this paper I built a uniﬁed model of economic growth to account for the time-series
evolution of output, fertility and population in transition through the industrialization of
the British economy. For this purpose, I merged the models presented in Galor and Weil
(2000) and and in Hansen and Prescott (2002) to capture the importance of human capital
formation, fertility decline and the transition from agriculture to industry in transition from
stagnation to growth. Furthermore, I also incorporated young adult mortality in my model
which allowed to diﬀerentiate the behavior of fertility and population in certain periods.
This way, the model captures explicitly the shift from a primitive to a modern sector in
the transition from stagnation to growth, without assuming away human capital formation
and the endogenous determination of population and fertility. Moreover, the presented
simulations of the model economy signiﬁcantly improve upon the quantitative performance
of the existing literature by successfully capturing the evolution of fertility, population and
GDP of the British economy between 1750 and 2000.
One extension of the present model can be made by endogenizing the mortality rate ξt.
Considering that life expectancy is foremost aﬀected by leaving standards, one way of doing
this is assuming that the mortality rate is some decreasing and convex function of output
per capita.
Moreover, the model economy can also be used to quantitatively investigate behavior of
relevant variables in diﬀerent economies. In this regard, similar simulations can be performed
to explain data from various other European countries, but lack of data might be a serious
issue here.
21Appendix
Here I provide the proof of the proposition 2.
Proof.






Given w and rK I can write the proﬁt function (for simplicity of notation drop time and
modern sector subscripts) as
Y − wN − rKK. (33)































































θ−1 = 0. (39)





























θ−1 > 0 (42)
if and only if inequality (18) is satisﬁed. To prove this, it is enough to show that (18)
and (38) are equivalent.
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